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The Climate Responsibility Norm Ensuring
Meaningful Participation in a Budding
International Norm
Katie Lindsay*

ABSTRACT
States are shifting their focus from preventing climate change to
lessening the potential harms and learning how to live within a harsher
climate. This paper focuses on why the international community needs to
focus on its climate responsibility to abate these growing concerns.
Focusing on the goal, not the form, would allow flexibility and for states to
adapt to climate change within their governmental and cultural norms.
Developing states should not dedicate resources to monitoring greenhouse
gas emissions when their national goals barely make a dent compared to
developed states’ total contributions. Mayer argues that a climate
assessment norm is on the horizon by expanding the international
environmental assessment norm. Here, I analyze Mayer’s analysis through
case studies of the United States, Ethiopia, South Korea, and Fiji, arguing
instead that, although a climate assessment norm may be budding, the
world needs to form a climate responsibility norm that allows all states to
meaningfully participate within their traditional customs.

* Katie Lindsay is a third-year law student at University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. This note was written for her International Environmental Law Class.
Thank you to Professor Takacs for the guidance and feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments need to significantly decrease greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions to lessen the effects of climate change and protect both humans
and the biodiversity that calls this planet home. The necessary changes are
substantial, requiring states to embrace adaption to our new environments
and available technologies.
The international community must
fundamentally shift from abusive GHG practices to renewable and
sustainable ways of life to successfully maintain our planet. Developed
states need to alter their GHG production drastically. In contrast,
developing states need to focus on adaption solutions and avoid the trap of
GHG dependence to raise their standards of living. The international
community needs to push states to focus on the goal, not the form, and
allow flexibility in adapting to climate change impacts within their
governmental and cultural customs.
The lack of success in mitigating international GHGs to sustainable
levels illustrates why governments need to start preparing for the worst
effects, particularly in less affluent developing nations. Physically seeing
the adaption measures necessary will conscript humans to lessen climate
impacts and allow states to rebound more effectively from climate
disasters. A climate assessment would incentivize states to consider the
GHG impacts of a developmental or governmental policy. This climate
assessment idea builds on other agreed-upon international norms, such
as the norm against transboundary harm, intergenerational equity, and
environmental
assessments.
Mayer
takes
these
principles
and international climate change agreements to argue for a budding climate
assessment norm.1 Initially, the benefits of a climate assessment norm are
appealing. However, the struggles developing nations have faced with
environmental impact assessments illustrates the need for a climate norm
that fosters compliance within each nation’s different governance and
cultural norms. States that are not already successfully improving the
environment through environmental assessments or lack meaningful public
participation will not benefit from another empty action. At the same time,
developed states that institute climate assessments but not significant
mitigations perpetuate another type of empty action under the climate
assessment title. These distinct challenges demonstrate why a climate
assessment norm must sprout from the common but differentiated
responsibilities norm because different states must prepare differently for
the various impacts and goals that each state must meet.

1. Benoit Mayer, Climate Assessment as an Emerging Obligation Under
Customary International Law, 68 BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 271 (2020).
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This paper begins with Section I, discussing environmental
assessments and Mayer’s idea of climate assessments as a budding
international norm. Section II describes the environmental assessments,
climate assessments, and adaption case studies of the United States and
California, Ethiopia, South Korea, and Fiji. Section III argues for the need
to embrace a climate responsibility norm instead of pushing western values
onto states without adequately addressing the abatement of climate impacts.

HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS AND
THE BUDDING CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM
A. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LEGAL HISTORY
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of the United States
is considered the genesis of international environmental assessments. This
act required any federal government action to analyze the environmental
impacts of the proposed action.2 After other states adopted this policy, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) solidified this as an international
concept in the Pulp Mills decision.3 In Pulp Mills, Argentina argued
Uruguay had not adequately notified Argentina before a project’s initial
approval that could impact the shared river of Argentina and Uruguay.4
Uruguay counter-claimed that it had met its burden because although
the international norm required an EA, which Uruguay completed, it did
not institute any required procedures.5 The Court disagreed and held that
the practice had gained the required level of acceptance among the states to
establish an international norm requiring the completion of an EA when
there are risks of substantial environmental impacts to a shared resource.6
In Pulp Mills, the ICJ found that Uruguay had not fulfilled its due
diligence, holding that the duty of vigilance and prevention required more
than Uruguay had completed.7 This case illustrates that EAs are not only
enforceable internationally but that each state must enforce its specific
standards and due diligence to meet the EA requirement.8 Thus, the ICJ
decision found that the EA norm had become an erga omnes.9

2. National Environmental Policy Act §102, 42 U.S.C. 4332(C) (1969).
3. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgement 2010
I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20).
4. Id. at ¶ 215.
5. Id. at ¶ 216.
6. Id. at ¶ 223.
7. Id. at ¶ 205; Mayer, supra note 1, at 303.
8. Pulp Mills, supra note 3, at 32, 34; see also Mayer, supra note 1, at 305.
9. Id.
179
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B. THE BEGINNINGS OF A CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM
In understanding the international community’s EA norm, Mayer
argues for a budding international climate assessment norm.10 A climate
assessment (CA) is when an EA includes an estimate of the GHG emissions
a development will expend and the impacts of such expenditure.11 Thus,
CA allows decision-makers to fully picture a project’s environmental and
climate change impacts, particularly the cumulative impacts of a project
and whether the community should undertake such an action. CA would
thus pressure states and lower governments to meet GHG targets because
they will have more concrete knowledge of their GHG contributions and
increase mitigation requests. After all, mitigations frequently go hand in
hand with decision-makers and public knowledge of a project’s impacts.
Mayer argues that CA is a budding international norm.
First, numerous countries have started to study GHG impacts within their
EAs, such as South Africa, Hong Kong, and the United States.12 Second,
many states have a desire to meet their global reduction
goals.13 Third, even without specific legal obligations, some states are
enacting CA ideals: China has one example in its Ministry of
Environmental Protection guide on environmental impact assessments.14
The World Bank has also stated that estimates of GHG impacts are part of
“good international industry practice.”15 Nevertheless, Mayer points out
that not all states follow this practice. Some states bar GHG estimates, and
others allow GHG estimates inconsistently, which leaves the method
incomplete overall yet potentially growing in international acceptance.16
In comparison to state actions, international treaties only hint at the
idea of a CA norm. No climate change treaty or agreement requires CAs,
and
state
sovereignty
reigns
high.
However,
the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states
that
nations should consider climate change impacts to the extent feasible, and
the UN General Assembly recognized the need to integrate
climate change measures into national policies.17 The Paris Accords
agreed to pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim
of achieving the objectives of the agreement.18 However, no state

10. Mayer, supra note 1, at 274.
11. Id. at 273.
12. Id. at 273, 298.
13. See id. at 271-72.
14. Id. at 285.
15. Mayer, supra note 1, at 286 (citing WORLD BANK, REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE
WORLD BANK’S SAFEGUARD POLICIES 21 (2016), https://perma.cc/3JYC-U7H6).
16. Id. at 288.
17. Mayer, supra note 1, at 289, 290; Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1.
18. Paris Agreement, supra note 17.
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specifically mentions EA as a tool for climate change mitigation.
Additionally, the Minsk Declaration by the United Nations Economic
Commission for European States outlined a shared vision to develop
national climate change action and incorporate specific mitigation and
adaptation measures into regional policies.19 Lastly, states could interpret
CA in both the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea and the
Convention on Biological Diversity.20 Both treaties require EAs, and
Mayer argues that since climate change will impact both the oceans and
biodiversity so severely, knowledge of GHG impacts is vital to meet these
conventions’ protections.21 These obligations do not definitively find a CA
requirement in international law, but they all point to a general obligation
forming within the international community.

C. INITIAL COMPLICATIONS OF A CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM
One initial concern is who receives the duty of CA. For EAs, the duty
is due to the states potentially affected, but climate impacts are global.22 It
is unreasonable to require global notification and the duty to assess impacts
held to all other states. Scholars have also brought up how to
measure GHG impacts because every project could have a substantial
impact and no significant impact based on the scale of
assessment.23 Nevertheless, neither of these critiques eliminates the CA
potential because CA is not a results-driven commitment but a methoddriven commitment.24 Mayer argues that the idea is that states agree to
work in good faith based on the norm of common but differentiated
responsibilities to reduce emissions based on the climate agreements
discussed above.25 Therefore, CA could be accomplished by not looking at
a project’s global GHG contributions but instead at the total GHGs of both
the proposed project and the alternatives to find a reasonable GHG level
for the type of project and whether the proposed project is significantly
higher than alternatives. 26 This process would work to find the most
efficient forms of projects over time. By viewing CAs this way, it
illustrates the potential for CA growth into an international customary
norm, and public participation in EA can expand this norm because GHGs
are arguably the most pressing environmental issue, and public
participation would demand action to further prevent or lessen climate
19.
20.
21.
22.

Mayer, supra note 1, at 291.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 292 (citing N. Craik, Principle 17, in THE RIO DECLARATION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMMENTARY 451, 458 (J.E. Viñuales ed., 2015)).
23. Id. at 293–294.
24. Id.
25. Mayer, supra note 1,at 301.
26. Jacqueline Peel, Environmental Impact Assessment and Climate Change, in
ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 348, 357 (Michael Faure ed., 2016).
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impacts. However, this assumes a meaningful public participation process,
and the case studies demonstrate that not all developing states have
achieved or strive for meaningful participation.

CASE STUDIES ON ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS
EVOLVING INTO CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS
In compiling case studies to examine a potentially budding CA norm,
a stark contrast between developed and developing states became apparent.
While many developed nations are beginning to institute CAs in some form
within their EA requirements, many developing nations are instead hoping
to embrace climate adaption strategies that will grow their economies and
potentially expand GHGs but with an eye towards long-term carbonneutrality. First, this section discusses the United States EA and CA
requirements and then discusses California’s CA requirements. Second,
this section discusses Ethiopia’s EA and its plans to leapfrog to green
technology. Third, South Korea will provide a brief insight into a recently
developed nation’s actions. Finally, Fiji will complete the case studies by
examining its past struggles with environmental standards and its current
adaptation plans.

A. THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT AND GHG REQUIREMENTS
As discussed above, the United States has an EA requirement but does
not have a complete CA developed. This section will discuss the EA’s legal
requirements, and the successful public participation element. Lastly, this
section will discuss California’s successful CA requirements.
i.

United States Historical Goals and Legal Requirements

NEPA protects the environment by requiring government decisionmakers to know a project’s full impacts before issuing approval. Congress
enacted NEPA to promote the general welfare and create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature could exist in productive harmony
for present and future generations.27 The heart of NEPA requires every
major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human
environment to create a detailed statement on its environmental impacts.28
NEPA creates procedural requirements for agencies to complete an EA
analysis if a project may significantly impact the environment.29

27. Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy Act §101, 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1969).
28. U.S.C. 4332(C).
29. U.S.C. 4332(C).
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ii. Public Participation Under the U.S. NEPA Process
The public can participate in this process both through litigation and
the notice and comment process. Agencies must respond to every comment
received by the public in the final rulemaking and provide a concise
statement of its basis and purpose.30 As long as the agency has received
comments on an issue, the public has exhausted their administrative options
and can litigate the issue if the public believes that the agency did not follow
proper procedures or has substantive issues with the project. This process
gives the public both judicial and administrative ways to participate in
governmental decision-making that impacts the environment.
The current U.S. GHG regulations take a step backward for the U.S.
but suggest discussing GHG impacts within the EA analysis. NEPA
requires the rule of reason for determining significant impacts.31 The
guidance discusses that although agencies should not consider GHG
impacts above other impacts, GHG impacts are still a part of the calculus
if, in the agency’s experience and expertise, it determines that the project’s
GHG emissions could cause significant impacts.32 Additionally, the
guidance discusses how agencies can use indirect and cumulative GHG
emissions to review climate change impacts as long as there is a sufficiently
close causal relationship.33
However, if an agency believes the
quantification of GHGs would be overly speculative, the agency can omit
the discussion and explain its decision.34 This assessment gives agencies
several ways to discount GHG impacts but shows that there are times when
an agency must analyze GHG impacts under NEPA. Thus, the U.S. is
starting to require GHG impact assessments and indicates a potential future
climate assessment norm. The previous U.S. administration cut back on this
progress, but the new Biden administration seems likely to reverse this
course.35 Additionally, state progress discussed below further solidifies the
United States’ intention to move towards CAs despite the national volteface.

30. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1946).
31. Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30097, 30097-98 (June 26, 2019).
32. Id.
33. Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43331 (July 16, 2020).
34. Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43331 (July 16, 2020).
35. Juliet Elprin, Brady Dennis, and John Muyskens, Tracking Biden’s
Environmental Action, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2021); see also Kelsey Burger, Biden
CEQ Pick Signals NEPA Changes, GREENWIRE (Dec. 21, 2020).
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iii. California’s Increased CA Requirements Under Its NEPA Equivalent
The United States allows its states to enact their own NEPA
equivalents with GHG requirements. California takes NEPA a step farther
than most, requiring an EA with a GHG assessment for all state agency
actions and requiring mitigation of environmental impacts when feasible.36
California achieves its high standard through several state statutes to ensure
analysis and consideration of GHG impacts before project approval. In
2006, the California Legislature enacted the California Global Warming
Solutions Act to reduce GHGs in California to 1990 levels by 2020 and
require GHG reductions that are real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable,
enforceable, and additional to other legally required GHG reductions.37 In
2008, the Legislature enacted the Sustainable Communities and Climate
Protection Act to require counties to plan land use and transportation
systems to further assist in GHG emission reductions.38 The California
Legislature also amended the Global Warming Solutions Act in 2016 to
further require GHG reductions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030 and 80%
reductions by 2050.39 Lastly, under the 2018 update to California’s NEPA
equivalent, agencies must analyze the GHGs of proposed projects under the
broader climate change context, not just concerning state or national
emissions totals and whether there are plans to mitigate the cumulative
effects.40 California has already reduced its emissions and plans to be
carbon-neutral by 2045, highlighting its commitment to CA and GHG
mitigation requirements.41 California is not alone in state CA requirements
but provides a view of the possible requirements developed states could
undertake within a CA norm.

B. ETHIOPIA’S ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND CLIMATE
RESILIENT GREEN ECONOMY
Ethiopia does not have any CA requirements but has a detailed EA.42
Despite legislative efforts and treaty commitments requiring sufficient
EAs, the Ethiopian EA has a few flaws that severely limit its effectiveness.
In understanding the EA flaws, a further CA requirement would not help
36. Cal. Pub. Res. § 21061 (2019).
37. Cal. Health & Safety § 38562 (2018); Governor’s Office of Planning and
Research, CEQA and Climate Change Through California Environmental Quality Act
Review 3 (June 19, 2008).
38. Cal. Pub. Res. §§ 21155, 21159 (2009).
39. Governor Brown and Alex Padilla, Governor Brown Establishes Most
Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target in North America, EXECUTIVE ORDER B-3015 (Apr. 29, 2015).
40. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15064.4 (2018).
41. Anne Mulkern, California Can be Climate-Neutral in 25 Years–With Drastic
Action, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/A2AP-JPEY.
42. Gedifew Yigzaw, History of Implementation of Environmental Impact
Assessment Proclamation No.299/2002, 50 ENV’L POL’Y & L. 81, 83 (2020).
184

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 2021

Ethiopia reach its goal of a middle-class economy based on a climateresilient model. This section will discuss Ethiopia’s EA requirements and
international commitments, Ethiopia’s climate change plans, and why CA
would not help Ethiopia meet its goals.
i.

History of Ethiopia’s EA Requirements

Ethiopia’s EA requirements started to form in the 1980s with specific
water resource developments that the United Nations and the World Health
Organization developed.43 Additional donor-funded irrigation projects
expanded the use of EAs in Ethiopia.44 Nevertheless, it was not until 2002
that the formal process began with the Ethiopian Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) enacting the Environmental Impact Analysis
Proclamation.45
The Proclamation requires any major planned
development project or public policy that is likely to harm the environment
to conduct an EA.46 The government requires that the project proponent
ensure it meets all requirements before having the relevant environmental
body approve the project.47 The environmental body may require
additional obligations before the proponent is allowed to begin the
project.48 The EPA also compiles guidelines and directives for whether a
type of project requires an EA.49 Ethiopia’s EA requires public
participation in providing access to the environmental studies and the
required inclusion of public comments, particularly from the affected
communities.50
Ethiopia is a signatory to the United Nations Rio Declaration, the
African Convention, and includes EA principles within its Constitution.51
All of these international conventions implicitly require member states to
institutionalize EA principles within their state.52 The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia’s Constitution section on Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms states explicitly that Constitutional interpretation should
conform in a manner that includes all internationally agreed upon
instruments adopted by Ethiopia.53 This interpretation requirement shows
that these Conventions and Declarations frame the debate within Ethiopia

43. Yigzaw, supra note 42, at 82.
44. Id. at 83.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 84.
50. Id. at 83, 85.
51. D.G. Gidey, The Role of Public Participation in Environmental Impact
Assessments in Ethiopia: Theory and Practice, TILBERG U. 235, 250–252 (2017).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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by providing a guide for how the government is to implement its
environmental laws.
ii. Regulatory and Judicial Hindrances to Meaningful Public
Participation
Ethiopia’s EA requirements fail to provide accountability for project
impacts because the EA structure does not support meaningful public
participation and oversight. First, there are no explicit requirements for
public participation, except that proponents must attempt some form of
participation.54 Project proponents usually complete this obligation via
surveys or town halls.55 This allowance permits project proponents to avoid
meaningful public participation by not allowing participation until the
project is too far along or so early it avoids meaningful knowledge of the
issues.56 This lessens the value of the EA requirement. Also, governmental
agencies must determine if project proponents have completed a sufficient
EA but only have fifteen working days from submission to complete their
findings and make a recommendation.57 These institutional challenges
highlight that Ethiopia does not place a high value on the EA information
because project proponents can easily manipulate or avoid meaningful EA
oversight and participation.
In reviewing the administrative processes, a similar issue arises under
Ethiopians’ ability to appeal a governmental decision. In Radical Academy,
a school filed a grievance with the Ethiopian EPA and the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry regarding a large hospital construction project
adjacent to the school that did not complete the required EA.58 The EPA
responded by telling the construction company that when the construction
permit was issued, the EPA advised against building a hospital near the
school because of the environmental impacts each would cause on the
other.59 However, the EPA did not include an administrative order to stop
construction; instead, the EPA disclaimed responsibility for any
environmental problems that may arise.60 This avoidance of responsibility
implicitly endorses continued construction and the continued abrogation of
future EAs.
The judicial system has also proved unhelpful in seeking enforcement
of EA procedures. Ethiopia does not follow the common law tradition
where courts have judicial review powers; instead, the Ethiopian Supreme

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
186

Yigsaw, supra note 42, at 83.
Gidey, supra note 51, at 383, 390, 397.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 269–270.
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Court has invalidated lower court appeals claiming such power.61 In
Privatization and Public Enterprises Supervising Agency v. Heirs of Nur
Beza Terega, the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court stated that
ordinary courts in Ethiopia have no inherent judicial power to review the
decisions of administrative bodies because, per the Supreme Court, judicial
power emanates from statute.62 This holding shows that the public has little
recourse from the courts because unless a statute explicitly allows appeals,
the Supreme Court will not uphold a lower court review of agency action.
The lack of meaningful public participation and meaningful judicial
recourse shows that Ethiopia’s EA requirements – although appearing
strong on their face – have not acquired a meaningful status. Ethiopia’s
most significant issue is its top-down approach.63 The higher government
bodies enact far-reaching environmental standards but do not provide
enough enforcement and guidance to ensure success from the bottom up.64
This case study shows that even when an international standard becomes a
norm, that does not ensure successful implementation even if states have
adopted the norm into their government and legal structures.
iii. Ethiopia’s Self-Imposed Climate and GHG Commitments
There are few CA concerns in Ethiopia because of the state’s low
GHG emissions. Ethiopia is a developing nation and voluntarily declared
that it would limit its GHGs to one hundred and forty-five megatons of
carbon dioxide under the Paris Agreement; this would be two-hundred and
forty-four percent above Ethiopia’s 1990 levels.65 Additionally, Ethiopia
has a long-term goal of becoming carbon neutral.66 Ethiopia’s plan is the
Climate-Resilient Green Economy (CRGE), where it hopes to achieve a
middle-income lifestyle for its citizens while not increasing its GHGs from
2010 levels. Ethiopia plans to accomplish this through four pillars:
1. Improving crop and livestock practices for higher food security
and farmer income while reducing emissions,
2. Protecting and re-establishing forests for their economic and
carbon stocks,
3. Expanding renewable sources of energy for domestic and regional
markets, and

61. Gidey, supra note 51, at 270–271.
62. Id. at 271.
63. Id. at 398, 405.
64. Id.
65. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green
Economy: National Adaptation Plan (May 2019), https://perma.cc/835R-QQBV; Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green
Economy Strategy 2, 11 (Nov. 2011), https://perma.cc/HW94-S8D3.
66. Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green Economy Strategy, supra
note 65, at 22.
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4. Leapfrogging to modern and energy-efficient technologies in
transport, industrial sectors, and buildings.67
Ethiopia was supposed to release its update on the CRGE in 2020, but
it was delayed, presumably due to both the COVID-19 pandemic and a
potential civil war.68 If the CRGE fails because of similar EA struggles, it
would further demonstrate the impotence of a CA norm for Ethiopia
because it would require more paperwork and fail to provide meaningful
enforcement standards or raise living standards.
However, presuming Ethiopia’s CRGE goal succeeds, this would
avoid the standard GHG-focused model, grow its economy using green
technology, and sell carbon stocks to help finance its ambitious goals.
Ethiopia has planted three and a half million trees; the Ethio-Wetlands and
Natural Resources Association is working on how to incorporate coffeegrowing onto forest floors to allow communities to profit from forests.69
These actions motivate local communities to care for their forests instead
of clear-cutting for raising exportable cattle. Currently, fuelwood is one of
the primary energy sources satisfying the energy needs of about ninety
percent of Ethiopia’s rural households.70 CRGE plans to disseminate fuelefficient or alternative-fuel cookstoves to lessen forest destruction and
combine this program with reforestation efforts, significantly decreasing
Ethiopia’s GHG emissions and increasing its forest health.71 Ethiopia has
also built its Grand Renaissance Dam, which it plans to use for hydropower
to lessen its GHG needs further.72 Unfortunately, the dam has met with
international objections as Egypt worries about Ethiopia damming Egypt’s
only water source.73 Egypt has threatened war over the dam filling, and
there have been no successful agreements on how to fill the dam.74 Sudan,

67. Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green Economy Strategy, supra
note 65, at 22.
68. Siobhan O’Grady, What’s Behind the Conflict in Ethiopia, WASHINGTON POST
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/9VMS-MH8J.
69. Steve Zwick, How Ethiopia is Slowing Climate Change by Reviving its Forests
– and its Economy, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/5LBVGCD7; University of Huddersfield, Preserving Coffee and Forests in Ethiopia for a
Sustainable Future, PHYS.ORG (July 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q2GC-DZBT; Eyder
Peralta, Ethiopia Plants 350 Million Trees as Part of ‘Green Legacy’ Program, NPR (Jul.
31, 2019), https://perma.cc/V9LR-FQGD.
70. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green
Economy: Green Economy Strategy, 103 (Nov. 2011) https://perma.cc/8UZP-PP7T.
71. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, supra note 70, at 14.
72. Ruth Michaelson, It’ll Cause a Water War: Divisions Run Deep as Filing of
Nile Dam Nears, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/B838-KX2F.
73. Id.
74. Aljazeera News, Sudan Rejects Ethiopia Proposal to Sign Nile Mega-Dam
Agreement, ALJAZEERA (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/49PL-4V83.
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the other affected state, has also recently spoken out against Ethiopia filling
the dam due to environmental and social concerns.75
The CRGE plan could be an example of how developing nations can
grow economies, raise living standards through technological
advancements, and improve carbon sequestration by rehabilitating their
local environments through local customs. Ethiopia has well-established
EA requirements, yet with environmental oversight agencies abdicating
responsibility and little meaningful public participation, it raises the
question of whether the CRGE will be successful. If the CRGE uses a topdown approach and rare bottom-up enforcement or oversight, there could
be comparable results to its failed EA process. This top-down approach is
a major concern in developing nations because it pushes the western
standards of EA enactment without incorporating how local populations
will participate in the process to allow publicly demanded mitigations to
thrive. However, tying the CRGE to economic growth and living standards
increases political motivations to ensure CRGE’s chance of success.
If Ethiopia enacts further CA requirements without first resolving the
current EA faults, there would likely be similar failures. A developing
state’s politicians have no incentive to reduce their state GHGs when major
social and economic problems need solving. Once Ethiopia can improve
its EA public participation and potentially alter its judicial appeal
processes, Ethiopia could add a CA requirement. But as it stands, CA would
be another empty procedural process until public knowledge of its potential
pushes agencies to require more than project proponent suggest for fear of
public outcry. Conversely, the benefits of using traditional customs and
values to build a green economy based on CRGE would promote a more
environmentally conscious citizenry because the public would immediately
see the benefits of green technology and higher standards of living in a
locally recognizable way, and this would further CRGE expansion. This
issue demonstrates why CA is not the norm the international community
should embrace. A climate responsibility norm would welcome the CRGE
process for developing nations because it allows for long-term reductions
of GHGs, adaption to the impacts of climate change, all while meeting the
needs of Ethiopians within their current customs and values.

C. SOUTH KOREA ILLUSTRATES CA BENEFITS FOR RECENTLY
DEVELOPED NATIONS
In contrast to Ethiopia, South Korea (Korea) has recently enacted CA
requirements. Korea EA requirements began as prior consultations in 1977
under the Environmental Conservation Act, becoming formal EAs in some

75. Aljazeera News, Sudan Rejects Ethiopia Proposal to Sign Nile Mega-Dam
Agreement, ALJAZEERA (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/49PL-4V83.
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sectors in 1981 under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy.76 In
2009, the Korean Ministry of the Environment published the first GHG
impact assessment guidelines to promote climate change awareness.77 CA
is only a legal requirement if the environmental impact assessment scoping
committee believes that the nature of the development, size, or strategic
significance warrants CA requirements.78 In reviewing the year 2010, after
this CA requirement became official, twenty-six projects conducted EAs,
with eight of these projects including a CA analysis.79
In comparing the United States, South Korea, and Ethiopia, it shows
CA as a natural extension since the U.S. requirements are more established
and have ample public participation and enforcement and some concrete
CA requirements. Ethiopia does not require CA but has only recently
begun EA requirements and still has some faults to work through. Korea
falls in the middle of the spectrum. However, CA is an urgent matter that
is only becoming a norm because of the imminent climate impacts that have
started occurring. Korea does not face the developing nation concerns that
Ethiopia faces; additionally, Korea heavily emits GHGs primarily through
coal energy production while Ethiopia emits very few GHGs.80 Korea has
said it is committed to not approving new coal power plants, but there
appear to be some loopholes in this commitment, and many plants are
relatively new.81
If Korea follows the budding CA norm and requires CA for any new
coal plants, as the scoping committee can require, this would be more
desirable than not requiring any GHG actions. However, since Korea has
significant GHG emissions, a better outcome would be to alter the state
energy sources to renewables over coal. A CA could require renewables
for new projects as an alternative and promote GHG mitigation similar to
California’s requirements. However, Ethiopia shows that not all states have
robust public participation to ensure environmental protection through
government reporting and analysis. By embracing a climate responsibility
norm, states would take ownership of how their people interact with their
government and use this process to create robust GHG emission reductions
instead of a procedural reporting requirement of GHG emissions without
ensuring substantive reduction efforts. For Korea, lowering GHG
emissions would improve air quality, so a coal plant could include

76. Jeonghwa Yi and Theo Hacking, Incorporating Climate Change into
Environmental Impact Assessment: Perspectives from Urban Developments in South
Korea, 21 PROCEDIA ENG’G 907, 908 (2011).
77. Id. at 909.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 910.
80. Josh Gabbatiss, The Carbon Brief Profile: South Korea, CARBON BRIEF (Apr. 6,
2020), https://perma.cc/VD28-VVH8.
81. Id.
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renewables as an EA alternative to enhance air quality without considering
CA.82 Korea instituting a CA will bring benefits, but Korea has already
established an EA system for CA to follow.83 When states lack these
established standards, it lessens the chance of CA successfully reducing
GHGs. Climate change abatements do not have time to stumble because of
differing national values.

D. FIJI, MOVING TOWARDS ADAPTION WITH CLIMATE ASSESSMENT
Fiji is a developing nation that has embraced the CA and adaption
mentality. Nevertheless, there are challenges, particularly when examining
Fiji’s environmental protection efforts. Historically, a lack of respect for
traditional Fijian values has been the primary cause of Fiji’s environmental
failures.84 Fiji faces tension in its intermingling of indigenous rights and
national agency oversight, leaving indigenous people to fear the new
government will abrogate their rights through competing interests and
overlapping duties by state agencies.85 A significant reason for this conflict
is the tension between the western value systems and the Fijian historical
hierarchy and governance.86 First, this section will discuss Fijian EA and
CA history and the international obligations relating to climate change
impacts. Then, it will review land control policies and Fiji’s environmental
protection flaws. Last, it will discuss Fiji’s adaption and current CA plans
and future barriers to success.
i.

Fijian EA Requirements and International Obligations

Currently, Fiji requires an EA for all major projects and some smaller
projects within the coastal zone or thirty meters of a river or stream.87 The
Fijian EA authority must examine a development proposal and determine
if a significant environmental or natural resource impact is likely to occur.88
The EA requires both assessment and feasible mitigation measures and may
require public participation during the initial EA review.89 Additionally, the
public can view the EA within twenty-one days of submission to the

82. Gabbittis, supra note 80.
83. Korea: EIA Procedure, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE (June 8,
2020), https://perma.cc/56SP-7NND.
84. Jane Turnbull, Explaining Complexities of Environmental Management,
Management in Developing Countries: Lessons from Fiji Islands, 170 THE GEOGRAPHICAL
J. 64, 66 (2004).
85. Kiji Vukikomoala, et. al., An Analysis of International Law, National Legislation,
Judgements, and Institutions as they Interrelate with Territories and Areas Conserved by
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, Report 19, Fiji 26 (Sept. 2012).
86. Turnbull, supra note 84 at 74.
87. Fijian Islands Environmental Management Act of 2005: Part 3, LAWS.GOV.FJ
(Last Accessed Dec. 22, 2020).
88. Id. at Part 2(12)(3).
89. Id. at Part 2(29)(2).
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environmental authority.90 If the public disagrees with the authority’s
decision, the public can appeal the decision within twenty-one days from
the date of the decision to the Environmental Tribunal.91 However, this
tribunal has only heard three cases, and there is little public information
about its members, procedures, or decisions.92
Fiji has only had continuous democratic control for the past six
years.93 Previously Fijian governance included chieftains, a British colony,
and dominion by two different militaries and one civilian coup until 2014.94
Despite these domestic struggles, Fiji has instituted environmental
assessments, including a GHG impact assessment. Fiji has become a leader
in international climate change governance, being the first nation to ratify
the Paris Accords.95 Fiji is a signatory to the United Nations Convention
on Climate Change, the Montreal Protocol, and the Stockholm
Convention.96 Additionally, Fiji is a signatory to the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.97 Through all of these conventions, agreements, and legislation, Fiji
is working towards becoming carbon-neutral by 2050 and has a climate
adaption strategy that includes a framework for climate migrations if sealevel rise requires Fijian communities to move.98

90. Fijian Islands Environmental Management Act of 2005, supra note 87 at Part
2(30)(3).
91. Id. at Part 2(21)(6).
92. U.N. HRC, 43rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/53/Add.1, at 8, ¶ 38 (Dec. 27,
2019).
93. Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Fiji: Government and Society:
Constitutional Framework, BRITANNICA.COM, https://perma.cc/N5P6-MXJL.
94. Id.; Turnbull, supra note 84 at 70; see also Britannica, Fiji Government and
Society: Constitutional Framework, https://www.britannica.com/place/Fiji-republicPacific-Ocean/Government-and-society (last accessed Mar. 13, 2021).
95. Madeline Cuff, Fiji Becomes First Country in the World to Ratify Paris
Agreement, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/53LM-YJD2.
96. Status of Parties: Fiji, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://perma.cc/N4C8-H556; Status of Treaties: Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete Ozone Layer, U.N. Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-2a&chapter=27&clang=_en (last accessed Mar. 13, 2021); Status of Treaties: Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants May 22, 2001, U.N. Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII15&chapter=27&clang=_en (last accessed Mar. 13, 2021); United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
97. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818. 1760
U.N.T.S. 79; The Fijian Government, Fiji’s Contribution to the UNCLOS Praised at 25th
Anniversary of the International Seabed Authority, FIJI.GOV (Jul. 27, 2019),
https://perma.cc/M5LK-RUBG.
98. Fijian Ministry of Economy, Low Emission Development Strategy 2018-2050,
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI (2018); Fijian Ministry of Information, Republic of
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Fiji’s national environmental protections follow a top-down
approach that historically ignored bottom-up social and community needs
and faced struggles similar to Ethiopia. The Fijian Native Lands Trust
Board focused on allowing indigenous people to retain control and
receive compensation through tenure arrangements for the resources
locals lost to environmental conservation or development.99 The Fijian
national government and international organizations pushed EA practices,
despite Fiji’s struggles to fund hospitals, schools, or roads.100 When the
national government promoted environmental protections while Fijians
struggled for basic necessities, it created a culture of local acquiesce to
environmental protections for profit, not genuine desire for the EA
practices that western funding valued. Yet, the external westernized
organizations frequently blame environmental enforcement struggles on a
lack of education, technical deficiencies, or “institutional difficulties of an
immature state.”101 These “immature state” arguments assume that
western environmental management views are paramount and discount
the tension between Fijian’s basic necessity concerns and traditional
environmental practices.
ii. Local Control in Conflict with National Objectives
The local chieftain rule has come into conflict with national laws and
power structures. At the same time, socio-economic controls protect the
rights of indigenous populations and leave in place their hierarchical
customs. As the prior case studies have highlighted, public participation is
required to ensure EA success. Unfortunately, Fiji has a history of
restricting or discouraging public participation so that the historical elite
remain in control.102 The financial gains occur because the Native Lands
Trust Board receives a proportion of any funds the Board distributes to
indigenous populations for the use of their lands.103 The indigenous chiefs
distribute the remaining funds to the indigenous peoples as they deem
appropriate.104 These indigenous financial gains are not from a lack of
environmental concern but a fundamental question of who controls the
resources.
Fiji has long relied on customary governance systems and a council
of chiefs for environmental protection practices, but the national laws have
conflicted. The national government relies on the local community to

Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway Towards Climate Resilience, GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI (2018).
99. Turnbull, supra note 84, at 72.
100. Id. at 70.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 74.
103. Id. at 73.
104. Id.
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manage fisheries but does not grant the locals authority. This conflicting
agenda forces the local chiefs to rely solely on historical customary
enforcement.105
The indigenous population generally respects the
customary authority, but as financial gains from illegal fishing grow, the
lack of legally actionable authority significantly diminishes enforcement.106
The paramount Chief in Mancuta Province seized a boat that was illegally
fishing to enforce national laws and local customs.107 The national
government arrested the Chief for larceny because he lacked the authority
to seize property.108 Ultimately, the government dropped the charges
against him. However, it had a chilling effect on community enforcement
and highlighted the need to ensure that local enforcement has proper
authority under national laws.109
Initially, indigenous chiefs were the defining authority, and
subsistence fishing was the local custom. However, when western
governance began, there were efforts to promote artisanal fishing over
subsistence fishing, leading indigenous populations to become accustomed
to fishing to support themselves through sales instead of subsistence.110
These governmental promotions included providing outboard motorboats
and equipment, with the same government later regulating and banning said
equipment when environmental protection ideals arose.111 Additionally,
intermediaries have moved into some villages to help fishermen sell their
fish in nearby cities, allowing easy access to illegal fishing profits.112 In
altering the indigenous chief customary norms’ processes, it devalued the
Chief’s role in environmental protection, yet the national government later
desired such actions. This hierarchical void left the indigenous community
knowing that communal norms lack power and that the national
enforcement only occurs at the community level.
By instituting national measures within local community customary
power frameworks and supporting local power at the national level, the
most successful implementation of environmental laws can occur. When
the village of Tui Kubulau allowed traditional chiefs to administer the
national fishing licenses for non-subsistence fishing and matched protected
zones with local needs, it transformed the current system to meet national
standards through locally acceptable customs.113 In a different instance, the
105. Pepe Clark and Stacy Jupiter, Law, Custom, and Community-Based Natural
Resource Management in Kubulau District (Fiji), 37 ENV’T CONSERVATION 98, 101
(2010).
106. Id. at 102, 104.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 104.
110. Turnbull, supra note 84, at 73.
111. Id.
112. Clark, supra note 105, at 102, 104.
113. Id.
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fishermen discovered that legal protections did not extend to protected
areas at the national level, leading the fishermen to lose respect for the local
customs and protest the nationally mandated local protected zones.114
Taking national ideals and shaping them to fit local practices with national
legal mechanisms places a support structure for proper enforcement.
Historically, Fiji’s national government has discounted traditional
practices, brought in western legal standards, and required locals to enforce
these new laws as the national government desired.115 EA and CA call for
public participation and oversight, which does not align with Fiji’s
traditional customs. If the public does not participate, EAs fail because EA
requires the public to demand their government officials act. Without this
participation, EAs lose their power and become an empty and costly
procedural action.
iii. Fijian Climate Policies and Adaption Plans
These Fijian enforcement struggles have lessened the indigenous
power structures for more western power dynamics from the national
government. Thus, Fiji is losing its traditional environmental practices and
governance but gaining EAs in the process. In some ways, the current
Fijian climate adaption policy has benefited from this loss because it seeks
to embrace many western norms with a top-down national approach that
focuses on public participation that is now growing in Fijian acceptance
because of past struggles. The vertical integration section of the Fijian
National Adaptation Plan works to incorporate diverse social groups in a
participatory approach to decision making, with a particular focus on
gender differences in adaption needs and equitable access to financial
resources.116 Nevertheless, these ideals are vastly different from the Native
Lands Resource Trust Board based on the male lineage chieftains. The
reports so far do not discuss how these top-down approaches will ensure
integration with the local customs. However, the reports are not about the
bottom-up approaches. The National Adaption Plan could embrace the
climate responsibility norm by focusing its efforts on access to financial
resources and similar goals that could incorporate local values and customs.
However, the current version’s success will highlight if Fiji has embraced
the western public participation process or if it requires more historical
considerations in its implementation and enforcement to achieve success.
Unfortunately, the National Adaptation plan focuses heavily on
education and knowledge of climate issues and adaptation necessities, such
as water conservation and best farming practices.117 Only one adaption
114. Clark, supra note 105, at 101.
115. Id. at 104.
116. Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway Towards Climate
Resilience, supra note 98, at 51 § 9.8.
117. Id. at 5, § 10.
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action addresses strengthening community-based fisheries management,
while many focus on increasing knowledge and data to allow for more
informed future decision making.118 These statements start to point to the
claim that Fiji’s environmental struggles are due to their “immature state”
status. In reality, Fijian historical governmental customs and knowledge is
structured differently than western nations, and this difference is not about
a lack of community knowledge of environmental needs. Instead of
discrediting local knowledge, the National Adaption Plan needs to
recognize its national value to achieve more permanent success. One
example is when the Kubulau district Council of Chiefs successfully
instituted protected zones and fishery rotations based on traditional customs
and values prior to any national protections; this action protected the
district’s environment while respecting the culture through governance the
population understood.119
The National Adaptation Plan approach has similarities to Ethiopia,
where it hopes to move toward climate resilience and includes adaption
measures, such as potential climate migrations for the island
communities.120 Whether this plan will be successful or repeat previous
legal structures that lacked community support and participation will
depend on its implementation. In April 2020, Fiji released its report on its
plan for monitoring and enforcement.121 It focused on collecting data,
public participation, access to information, and using the data to shape
future adaption policy.122 Once the report on the National Adaptation Plan
review is complete, it will provide a better picture of Fiji’s success. But
since Fiji has embraced numerous democratic politics, there is a chance the
local customs are migrating towards participation and oversight. When the
fishermen protested customary norms because of their lack of national
enforcement, it demonstrated that Fijians are not against speaking up for
their rights and a desire for public participation. Successful EA and CA
policies require this kind of public outcry and national government
structures to hear people’s voices, which the National Adaptation Plan is
hoping to provide.
Ultimately, Fiji’s success in its Adaption Plan will depend on whether
the local citizenry has genuinely embraced the robust public participation
118. Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway Towards Climate
Resilience, supra note 98, at §§ 12.F.3, 12.
119. Clark, supra note 105, at 99.
120. Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway Towards Climate
Resilience, supra note 98, at 71 §14.
121. Fijian Ministry of Economy’s Climate Change and International Cooperation
Division, Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Fiji’s National Adaptation Plan
Process 22 (Apr. 2020).
122. Fijian Ministry of Economy’s Climate Change and International Cooperation
Division, Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Fiji’s National Adaptation Plan
Process 8, § 3 (Apr. 2020).
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values of westernized states. If the Fijians do not actively participate in the
environmental processes, it will lead to the continued failures not because
Fiji is an “immature state” but because Fiji does not have the same values
as the western states that created the EA process. In seeking to expand
towards a CA norm, Fiji must first figure out how to successfully use the
EA process. Conversely, a climate responsibility norm would allow Fiji to
tailor its GHG emission control to the local customs to achieve success
without the additional procedural hurdles that do not provide practical
benefits to the Fijians.

SHOULD A BUDDING CLIMATE ASSESSMENT NORM
TAKE HOLD?
A CA norm is spreading, with the European Union, United States,
Fiji, Western Australia, and Canada enacting some form of CA, among
others.123 However, there is yet to be a clear consensus on implementing
this requirement between states, mainly the conflicts arise in where the
significance threshold lies for GHG impacts, mitigation requirements, and
consistency.124 There needs to be further discussion on whether an
international CA norm should require significant standards and mitigation
requirements, substantially reducing climate impacts. However, these
increased requirements would push back the potential implementation of a
CA norm because it would further push against state sovereignty, which
has been the international CA’s biggest hurdle.
The case studies highlight the struggles developing nations have faced
in protecting the environment under EA standards. CA will not fulfill its
goal of lessening climate impacts enough under the time constraints of
impending climate catastrophes if developing states must fulfill costly
empty requirements. The international community should instead seek to
establish the norm of climate responsibility. Basing this norm on the norm
of common but differentiated responsibilities would allow the developed
states to continue their GHG monitoring while pushing these states to
embrace their responsibilities to protect the planet from the devastation they
have primarily caused. More importantly, climate responsibility would
also allow developing nations flexibility to maintain their cultural and
indigenous knowledge and power structures while seeking economic
growth and climate adaptions that avoid GHG emissions as much as
possible. Indigenous knowledge is not static, backward thinking, but
123. European Commission, Guidance on Integrating Climate Change and
Biodiversity into Environmental Impact Assessments 13, 39 (2013); Environmental
Protection Authority, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR GUIDELINE 1
(Mar. 2019).
124. Alexander Zaher, Two Arguments Against Environmental Impact Assessment
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, DEBATING CLIMATE LAW 1, 12 (2020).
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locally specific knowledge based on centuries of use and adapted to local
culture and environments.125 Developing nations have many pressing
issues that need addressing, and climate responsibility would allow
developing states to own their climate responsibility within their cultural
values and capabilities. Ethiopia and Fiji’s GHG contributions are nothing
compared to developed nations, and a CA requirement only takes resources
away from more practical solutions and government support programs.126
By embracing climate responsibility, states embrace a post-development
mindset and work to incorporate indigenous knowledge and customs with
more modern practices to find the best way forward and avoid conflicts
between local and national governments.127
Ethiopia’s CRGE is a fitting example of a developing state not doing
CA but still avoiding GHG developments by seeking international funding
for renewable projects to help Ethiopia raise its living standard to a middleclass economy. Although filled with other environmental consequences
and political turmoil, building a dam is likely an excellent idea to support
Ethiopia’s energy needs without GHG consumption while providing a more
reliable water source for Ethiopia. The dam has caused unrest, and Ethiopia
is also currently struggling to fend off a civil war. Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s
struggles highlight the need for developed countries to financially pay for
the GHG pollution they created, not based on charity but based on
responsibility. However, the idea of state sovereignty reigns high in
international negotiations, and there is little incentive to agree to pay for
something without a tangible benefit to developed states. By working
towards a norm of climate responsibility, it solidifies and expands the
common but differentiated responsibilities norm and its relation to climate
change because it allows each state to work together while resolving GHG
impacts within their domestic norms and traditions.

125. Sunday Olaluwa Dada, Post-Development, and the Role of Tradition in the
Process of Development, EKITI STATE UNIVERSITY 75, 84 (2016).
126. Johannes Freidich et.al., This Interactive Chart Shows Changes in the World’s
Top Ten Emitters, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Dec. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/KG7K3U9X.
127. Dada, supra note 125, at 88.
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CONCLUSION
The climate assessment norm, argued by Mayer, is likely growing in
international acceptance from the domestic efforts to include climate
assessments in EA practices. However, this norm pushes the western
mindset onto non-westernized nations.
By embracing climate
responsibility, all nations can meet their GHG reduction targets and
succeed on their terms. Further research is necessary into other states’
climate adaption efforts and successes that value indigenous customs. A
growing CA norm is not a negative. Developed nations are the main
contributors to GHG pollution and climate impacts. If all of these nations
seriously considered and established CA, preferably with significant
mitigation requirements for their GHG emissions, GHGs would
significantly lessen and, with this, the climate impacts that all nations face.
Nevertheless, if there are budding international norms, these norms
should take a flexible approach to compliance so that all nations can benefit
from their implementation. Ethiopia and Fiji have not shown many benefits
from EA procedures because this norm does not consider their governance
structures or cultural practices, leaving significant gaps in enforcement.
Thus, the EA has avoided the environmental protections it is supposed to
foster. A climate norm must do better if the international community
desires the significant abatement of climate impacts that our planet
desperately needs.
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